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MULTIPLE-CLASS EXISTENCE, CORRUPTION AND TRUST IN SOUTH AFRICA

Evangelos Mantzaris¹, Theodore Tsekeris², Charalambos Tsekeris³

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Abstract

Corruption in South Africa has been a major issue in the traditional and new media during the last few years. However, only a small number of researchers in various fields, from public administration and social policy to law and urban studies, have attempted to change the existing empirical understanding on this issue. In this sense, empirical socio-economic realities, associated in most cases to the realm of organizational behaviour, financial system dynamics and power relations, intertwine in the effort to analyze and interpret corruption. The present article aims at examining beliefs, attitudes and perceptions of a multi-class sample of Black African South Africans living in the Western Cape within the Cape Town Metropolitan Municipality, which is the only province in the country governed by the official opposition, the Democratic Alliance (DA). The sample consists of two groups: one of people who live in an established middle class area and the other in an informal settlement. The analysis of data obtained from a semi-structured questionnaire showed that, although the existing social differences amongst the groups, they both show a high degree of mistrust towards the institutions and have largely negative attitudes towards the corruptive behaviour of politicians and governing agents with a small number of exceptions.

Keywords: corruption, perceptions, government, class differences, South Africa

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¹ Anti-Corruption Center for Education and Research (ACCERUS), Stellenbosch University, Western Cape, South Africa. Email: Evangelos.Mantzaris@spl.sun.ac.za

² Centre of Planning and Economic Research (KEPE), Athens, Greece; ACCERUS, Stellenbosch University, Western Cape, South Africa. E-mail: tsek@kepe.gr

³ Research Centre for Greek Society, Academy of Athens, Greece; ACCERUS, Stellenbosch University, Western Cape, South Africa. Email: tsekeris@gmail.com (corresponding author)

Introduction

Corruption is widely seen as 'one of the most dangerous social ills of any society. This is because corruption, like a deadly virus, attacks the vital structures that make for society's progressive functioning, thus putting its very existence into serious peril' (Gire, 1999: 1). Public administration and economic literature abound of research and analysis on the dire negative consequences of corruption on a country's social and economic development and growth (Menzel, 2005; UNDP, 2008; UNDP, 2009; Markovits, 2011; OECD, 2012; Mantzaris, 2013; World Bank, 2013; Mantzaris et al., 2014). However, there still exists a lack of concrete, empirical work about the feelings, attitudes and beliefs of different social groups towards government institutions and their role in corruption. This research goes beyond newspaper and social media analysis, combining aspects of sociology, public administration and anthropology, and examining empirical socio-economic realities associated with organisational behaviour and power relations that intertwine in the effort to analyse and interpret corruption and, at least, some of its causes and repercussions.

The present article is based on a combination of empirical methods, both in their quantitative and qualitative dimensions and in a comparative perspective. This is so because its sample and units of analysis belong to widely diversified social and economic categories, despite the fact that they live side by side. The one part of the multi-class sample of Black African South Africans in Cape Town lives in spacious, well-groomed and fenced middle class houses, while the other in an informal settlement situated very close to the middle-class neighbourhood.

Semi-structured questionnaires facilitate the combination of quantitative and qualitative data and are based on an examination of the samples' exploring opinions, ideas, beliefs and perceptions in regard to political and state institutions and their connection to corruption, ethics, trust and good governance. Overall, despite the existing social and economic differences amongst the sampled groups, the similarity of negative attitudes towards the corrupt politicians, administrators and anti-corruption and other agencies are evident.

Trust fosters cooperative relations and is somehow central to the production of social order (Fukuyama 1995, Hardin 2002). It can be understood that attitudes of citizens involving their trust in political authority are basically rooted on their knowledge and understanding of real or imagined integrity of power-holders. Integrity or lack of it has significant implications for trust in democratic politics (Kaufman, 2005; Kaufmann & Kraay, 2008; Icheku, 2011). South Africa has witnessed

over the years a crisis of conscience and authority that is rooted in the high corruption levels in both private and public sectors, which, in most cases, lead to shoddy service delivery throughout the country (Booyesen, 2009; Alexander, 2010). This has led to a serious collapse in trust amongst large sections of the country's population, accompanied by political, economic and social crisis. This lack of trust has led to change in attitudes towards the very existence and integrity of power (Bond, 2012; Woods, 2012). The abuse of public office for private gain in South Africa has reached serious proportions and trust as a foundation of public consciousness is eroded as a consequence of persistent scandals. In these circumstances, the illegal gain of the corrupt is considered not only as financial, but largely political and social as it becomes synonymous with power, prestige, authority and reputation, such as re-election to government (Kaufmann et.al., 2007).

The gist of the paper is based on a multi-disciplinary treatise of social policy and urban studies, with emphasis on political trust, or lack of it, towards state institutions, as exemplified in the original works of Mishler and Rose (1997), Michelson (2003), Chang and Chu (2006), Cleary and Stokes (2006), Klesner (2009), and urban studies in a multi-cultural society to be found in the works of Meng (2009), Healey (2010), Ratcliffe and Krawczyk (2011), and Freestone (2012). We hereby set out to identify and analyse perceptions of vulnerable African people in the Western Cape in a comparative perspective, with special emphasis on those residing in an informal settlement within the City of Cape Town Metropolitan Municipality and a group in an established middle class area of the same township.

Social and class location In Cape Town

The research took place in Khayelitsha, a densely-populated location in the Cape Town metropolis, situated approximately 25 km from the center of the city. Its population has been estimated to be between 450000 to 2 million. Its 'formal' settlements were realized as a 'grand apartheid plan' since 1983, while informal settlements have mushroomed throughout this urban space over many years. They have been built by unemployed, workers and other internal migrants originating mainly from the Eastern Cape. Large numbers of them built their own shacks creating an overcrowded urban space (Social Justice Coalition, 2013: 2; UmthaWelanga, 2011: 4), where a wide variety of lifestyles, class contradictions and stratifications co-exist.

The apartheid 'grand plan' for the area envisaged a fairly multifunctional dormitory town, with virtually no significant economic activity, but things have changed significantly after 1994. The movement of lower middle

and middle class strata in the area opened up the establishment of a service sector, including a shopping center (considered a 'major achievement' by the Cape Metropolitan City Council), while at the same time the inhabitants of the informal settlement continue to have low or no income at all and to live a barely subsistence life. Most of the residents are unemployed and the few that are self-employed rely on selling meat, chicken, sausages, vegetables and fruits along the streets of the settlement (City of Cape Town, 2005; City of Cape Town, 2012: 12). Spazas (small house shops), taverns, and taxi businesses are also popular, but are mostly owned by people living in the formal settlements. The 2001 National Census indicated that two out of three residents lived in shacks. On the one hand, almost half of the population lived in formal housing, after 25000 new houses were built. On the other hand, there was also a continuous flow of newcomers arriving in the township which meant that, while the proportion of residents living in shacks had decreased, their total number increased (UmthaWelanga, 2011: 7).

The differentiation in class positioning and systems, as well as stratification within the same urban spaces cannot disguise the population's common problems, such as water scarcity and disruptions, high crime incidents, as well as inequalities which are articulated principally in both personal and communal relations and associations. It can be understood that the two groups differ significantly, in terms of resources, such as educational qualifications, skills, employment credentials, as well as income. Their status in the Weberian sense is significantly different, but living side by side for years has ultimately led to the creation of a 'more or less common identity', shaped principally by common roots, history, and culture, as well as of common interests, shaped by common experiences (Giddens, 2006: 302-303).

It is a situation not unique to Cape Town, where class distinctions do not necessarily lead to direct and confrontational class antagonisms, despite instances of increasing pauperization of those living in the informal settlements and make a living mainly through government's social grants for children, the old aged and the disabled (Mantzaris, 2013). The change in the political regime in South Africa in 1994 was instrumental in the rise of a new Black African middle class that took advantage of the new affirmative action, equity laws, and the dismantling of the apartheid state machinery, as well as higher education standards, and created a new bureaucracy aspiring to emulate the dictates of the 'new public management' terrain (Mantzaris & Pillay, 2013; Mantzaris & Pillay, 2014).

Enkanini

The informal settlement, eNkanini, where the interviews took place, is the poorest of the shack-dominated urban spaces. The area abounds of hand-made dwellings that are basically constructed on the shallow sandy soils of the area. Most of them are without foundations and built with cheap and rudimentary building materials, such as corrugated roofing sheets and planks, as well as oil drums. Its location is 0-10m above sea level, and thus seriously exposed to floods, heat waves, and wind/storm activities. The latest calculations show its population in the range of over 70 000, an almost 350 percent increase between 2001 and 2011, from 20 000 to about 70 000. More than half of its households earn less than R1 600 a month and two out of three still use paraffin for heating. There is lack of water in many of the higher situated locations. It is part of Ward 95, which also includes parts of the Kuyasa and Makhaza areas and is one of Khayelitsha's poorest and fastest-growing areas (City of Cape Town, 2005; City of Cape Town, 2012).

It is an area that has been in the forefront of what has been known in the last five years as 'service delivery protests' where periodically eNkanini residents block the main traffic artery leading to the highways and the city (Baden Powell Drive) with burning tyres, protesting for better toilets, water, and electricity. The police arrive and the groups' battle each other for hours, even days. The residents are throwing stones and petrol bombs, while police retaliate with water-cannons, teargas and occasionally rubber bullets. While the police are ever-present in such people-driven protests, sometimes even driven by SANCO (the South African National Civil Organisation), a full member of the African National Congress (ANC) 'Tripartite Alliance', it is absent when all sorts of crimes are committed in the area (Ground Up, 2014).

Residents have complained over the years of police absence and/or extremely slow responses when they are called to fight crime. The police on their part have acknowledged publicly that crime in the area has reached 'unacceptably high levels', but have indicated that the area's geographical and spatial structure of narrow alleyways makes the struggle against crime difficult if not impossible, especially at night. School gangsterism has been reported regularly and teenage gangs, such as the Vuras and Vatos, have become commonplace in the vicinity (Cape Times, 2014a).

Under such circumstances, community mobs have in most cases take the law into their own hands and punish suspects or crime perpetrators with death. This is because residents live in fear of criminals operating both in the eNkanini area as well surrounding informal settlements such

as Makhaza. A number of these, mainly young, unemployed men wake up very early in the morning and go to the train station pretending to be commuters, where they attack and rob people – mostly women who in turn scream and notify the community that then ‘take the deadly action’. In most occasions, suspects and crime perpetrators are chased, beaten and set alight. In eNkanini and elsewhere, this has been called ‘peoples’ justice’ (Cape Times, 2014b). It is known to the residents that the majority of criminal activities occur between midnight and 4am, because few people are awake to respond and the perpetrators are basically young school dropouts, who abuse drugs and regret their deeds when they are driven to what is known as the ‘field of death’, a playground where a spate of vigilante killings have taken place.

Within the context of poverty, ‘peoples’ justice’, the struggle for survival and the lack of services that are described as ‘basic human rights’ in South Africa’s Constitution (i.e. water, sanitation, electricity, and education), the residents also face time and again the brutality of invasions from the Cape Town metropolitan Anti-Land Invasion Unit that tears down hundreds of shacks that had been built on city-owned land in eNkanini. The ‘legal invaders’ of the City authorities always face a hail of stones, as residents resist the invasions and burn rubble and tyres in the road while attacking the police. The police and officials retaliate by firing stun grenades and water cannons to disperse crowds fluctuating between about 500-1000 people continuing to burn tires until they get arrested (Lobel, 2013).

There were five such evictions in 2014 and four in 2015 in the area and take place in a space of a few weeks as police confiscates all building materials personal documents of land invaders, most of who are basically backyard dwellers from the eNkanini informal settlement and Kuyasa. Most move on to the land because they could not afford rent (Lobel, 2013; Mzansi, 2014). As a multiplicity of second hand cars drive throughout the settlement, hundreds of multi-coloured illegal electricity connections span the street like spider-webs.

Makhaya

Census data shows that Khayelitsha is both richer and more developed than a decade ago, but the area is still one of the poorest in the Cape Town metropolitan area and protests over housing, crime and sanitation are common. Makhaya is the ‘middle-class diamond’ of Khayelitsha where the ‘business center’ and a swimming pool is situated (the only one in the township). The area is situated very near eNkanini, separated by the western boundary road, where fairly expensive and well-spaced brick houses exist, a few thousand of red, black and grey roofs of

houses, interspersed with vast electricity pylons that provide lighting at night (unlike Enkanini where pylons are absent).

Next to the formal housing area in the vicinity expanding into a few km away there is a new cluster of brand new building developments such as the Khayelitsha Mall and the new business district, where a new high-rising office block built for the future entrepreneurship class of the future is situated. Makhaya and its wealthier sections face their own problems as there have been many instances of break-ins, followed by the occasional western-movie style car chase where residents, or their private security guards, counter-attack potential house breakers or burglars. The residents of the area have also been facing problems with what they consider police inability to control the crime waves. Such incidents have led Makhaya's residents to take the law into their own hands and having meetings that sometimes last till the early hours of the morning, discussing how they can solve the situation.

For many months, residents in Makhaya have been going from house to house in the area where there are suspected gang members and criminals and warn parents of suspects or perpetrators to lock their houses and leave the area, or to report their children to the police. They have reported burglaries and break-in to the Harare police station, but they have been perpetually unhappy about the station's inactivity (Sabisa, 2014). Having described briefly the geographical locations and class dimensions of the key areas where the research took place, a short description of the research methods follows.

Methods

The project that took place over a period of three months between June and September 2015 constitutes a case study attempting to seek comparisons in respect of beliefs, ideas, attitudes and perceptions of socially differentiated groups living in the same spatial parameters within metropolitan Cape Town. It is rooted on the foundations of both qualitative and quantitative methodologies, because its findings and analysis utilizes both the information that includes words, sentences and narratives, while numerical meanings are also assigned to concrete or perceived realities in the effort to understand and interpret cause and effect relationships (Blumberg et al., 2005: 118, 124). Given the social and economic particularities of the area, a combination of information gathering techniques that included answers, debates, conversations and observations, as well as analysis and interpretations based on the researcher's understanding of the experiences, historical and present conditions, context, and realities, were included (Jankowicz, 2005: 213, 214).

The utilization of a semi-structured questionnaire and an open-ended section where respondents would open themselves in articulating their ideas, opinions, feelings, beliefs, attitudes and outlook based on their experiences within the political, ideological, economic, social and spatial environment was based on the belief that the results obtained would be open to comparisons and analysis that would be rich, detailed and diversified. Social realities and variables, such as educational status, required a careful utilization of an integrated approach devoid of one-dimensional data collection instrument or methods that would provide a more diversified field of knowledge acquisition as clarification, expansion, probing and elaboration on issues, beliefs and perceptions would be easier to obtain (Bryman & Bell, 2007: 132-133).

In our case and in terms of sampling, two groups of interviewees were selected through a systematic random sampling frame – i.e., a probability sampling. In this process, 50 households were chosen randomly in the informal settlement (eNkanini) and 50 respondents living in the Makhaya Section of the same township, but they belong to formal, mainly lower-middle and middle class African households. The process of selection of these two groups was based on Bryman and Bell (2007). The two Black African researchers who undertook the task of interviewing were thoroughly trained in order to exercise principled sensitivity to the rights of all respondents, especially their human dignity. They abided to the ethical undertaking to respect the privacy and dignity of all respondents. Anonymity and confidentiality were guaranteed to all interviewees.

Analysis of data

The analysis of data took both quantitative and qualitative forms as there was enumeration and comparison of the responses as well as analysis of the verbal responses. This approach allowed the researcher to elicit relevant themes based on the aims and objectives of the study. The data was coded by labelling similar aspects and sorting the information into distinctive categories. The original themes had been embedded within the questionnaire. Table 1 describes the main characteristics of the respondents in the two urban settlements (eNkanini and Makhaya) of the sample. Table 2 presents the results of the research for each of the two urban settlements. The following paragraphs provide explanations of the respondents and discussion about each of the question raised in the present research.

Table 1
Characteristics of respondents in the two urban settlements of the sample

Town section	eNkanini	Makhaya
No. of respondents	50	50
Male	21%	23%
Age characteristics		
<i>Between 19-30</i>	21%	8%
<i>Between 31-40</i>	14%	12%
<i>Between 41-50</i>	7%	18%
<i>Between 51-60</i>	6%	12%
<i>Older than 60</i>	2%	0%
Education		
<i>None</i>	11%	0%
<i>Grades 1-10</i>	28%	14%
<i>High School/Matric.</i>	9%	20%
<i>Diploma</i>	2%	10%
<i>University Degree</i>	0%	6%

Source: Authors' work

Table 2
Results of the research for the two urban settlements of the sample

1. How much do you trust the President and the national government of the country?				
<i>Never</i>	<i>Sometimes</i>	<i>Most Times</i>	<i>Always</i>	<i>Never heard/Don't know</i>
eNkanini 74%	26%	0%	0%	0%
Makhaya 58%	26%	0%	6%	10%
2. In your opinion is corruption common amongst Elected Provincial Leaders				
<i>Very common</i>	<i>Fairly common</i>	<i>Fairly rare</i>	<i>Very rare</i>	<i>No answer/Don't know</i>
eNkanini 42%	26%	20%	8%	4%
Makhaya 52%	24%	12%	4%	8%
3. In your opinion is corruption common amongst Elected City Councillors?				

eNkanini 72%	14%	8%	4%	2%
Makhaya 60%	16%	8%	6%	10%
4. In your opinion is corruption common amongst City Administration Officials?				
eNkanini 16%	18%	34%	22%	10%
Makhaya 20%	22%	30%	24%	4%
5. How much do you trust the Members of the National Assembly?				
<i>Not at all</i>	<i>A little bit</i>	<i>A lot</i>	<i>A great deal</i>	<i>Never heard/Don't know</i>
eNkanini 12%	28%	8%	0%	52%
Makhaya 46%	34%	14%	0%	6%
6. How much do you trust the Premier of the Province?				
eNkanini 70%	18%	12%	0%	0%
Makhaya 56%	18%	14%	12%	0%
7. How much do you trust your Provincial Government?				
eNkanini 58%	30%	12%	0%	0%
Makhaya 48%	24%	10%	2%	16%
8. How much do you trust the Hawks?				
eNkanini 20%	12%	10%	0%	58%
Makhaya 28%	26%	28%	0%	18%
9. How much do you trust the Police (SAPS)				
eNkanini 74%	16%	10%	0%	0%
Makhaya 58%	20%	22%	0%	0%

Source: Authors' work

Trust towards the President and the national government of the country

It can be deduced that there is a very strong mistrust for the President and the national government of the country in respect of the question. In

addition, the negative attitudes towards them cut across class, status, educational, gender and age background. The main reasons provided by the respondents for holding such attitudes were based on their belief that the 'President and the government are corrupt', 'the President only looks after himself and his family', 'the President does not punish the Ministers and officials who are corrupt', 'the national government does not abide by his promises to the people', and that 'the President and the government only visit the people before elections'.

Corruption amongst elected provincial leaders

Comparatively speaking, it is evident that the responses towards corruption amongst provincial leaders are not as strongly negative as the attitudes towards the President and the national government. Given the fact that the Western Cape is the only province that is ruled by the Democratic Alliance, an alliance of remnants of the White-controlled apartheid regime, big business, as well as substantial sections of the liberal white and 'coloured' (mixed race populations) middle and lower middle classes, one could feel that there is an affinity or even tacit support of the exclusively Black African population of the two areas for the party.

This is far from the truth as in the working class and poor area of eNkanini the majority of respondents felt that corruption was 'very common' and 'common' while the minority felt that it was 'fairly rare' and 'rare'. The interesting finding was that in that area the majority of those with the positive response were female (N=13). Very similar responses were recorded in Makhaye, but the reality still is that in comparative terms the attitudes and beliefs of respondents pointed out that they were harsher to the national government and the President when compared to the attitudes vis-a-vis the provincial counterparts.

Corruption amongst elected municipal councillors

South African municipalities' political leadership consists of political councillors who are directly elected or on a 'proportional basis', depending on the votes that a particular party scores. The responses indicate that there is a strong belief that elected city councillors (including those elected through 'proportional representation') are generally corrupt and the major reasons provided were that 'they sell RDP houses for money', 'they do not care about the people who voted for them', 'they are interested only for themselves', 'they do not even come to attend ward committee meetings because they are scared people will ask them questions about water, electricity and housing', and that 'they sleep with young girls'. The interesting observation emanating from these very negative responses is that despite the fact that the City

of Cape Town Municipality is ruled by the Democratic Alliance, Khayelitsha has been historically and at present an African National Congress (ANC) strong hold, meaning that the vast majority of both directly elected and 'proportional' representatives belong to the ANC.

Corruption of municipality administrative officials

In contrast to the previous attitudes towards corruption in respect of the politicians at different layers of government including the municipality, the majority of the interviewees' positive attitude in respect of corruption of city administration officials can be dissected and understood in a number of ways. Firstly, it needs to be taken into account that in the poorest informal area (eNkanini) there is very little contact of the inhabitants with administrative staff of the municipality, while there is occasional contact with politicians/councillors, who are not trusted as there have been accused for 'selling new built houses', 'organising part time jobs for their relatives and friends', 'taking care of certain areas of the informal settlement', or 'accepting bribes so they can put names high in the priority list/s for housing, or sanitation'. In respect of the interviewees in the middle-class area (Makhaya), the responses are the result that as acknowledged by the respondents, the municipal officials they have dealt with have been 'honest', 'straight-forward', 'better than councillors/politicians' and the fact that 'administrative officials do their jobs properly, while politicians are corrupt and act dishonestly'.

Trust for numbers of the National Assembly

The large number of the eNkanini residents who responded with the phrases 'do not know' 'have not heard about' the National Assembly belong to the poorest sections of the population, the older and less educated segments in the human settlement, mainly women (it needs to be said here that the interviewer/researcher also mentioned the word "Parliament" to them). The common denominator in these attitudes and responses is rooted on the realities of the harsh, occasionally inhuman conditions where women in their late 70's have to walk 500-800 metres to fetch water if she is lucky when the only tap in the vicinity is functional, and/or looking after three orphans in an increasingly hostile and dangerous environment because of the young gangs by using the meagre social grants distributed by the government to children and the aged.

The majority of these largely marginalized groups generally appreciate what the government does for them, their children and grand-children in the form of social grants, but they have no time to read newspapers, debate politics at those levels and make informed decisions. In fact, the cumulative sum of opinions regarding the issue found in Makhaya is also

not positive and emanated from all social groups in that area. The attitudes were that 'those there only care for themselves and their families', 'they are corrupt' 'they only care about big cars' 'they are wasting our money' amongst similar expressions.

Trust in the Premier of the Province

It can be seen that although the lack of trust towards the Premier is strong in both cases, it is greater amongst the eNkanini residents. One could assume that such generally negative attitudes towards the Democratic Alliance Premier, Helen Zille would be based on the fact that she is 'White female'. The reasons advanced for such feelings are based on the majority of the respondents' beliefs that 'the Premier does not care for African people', 'she surrounds herself with Whites', 'all people close to her are Whites'. There was also a feeling that the Premier as the head of the Government did more for 'coloureds' and whites than she did for Black Africans, but this was understood as the majority of the DA votes were from the 'coloured' community. In general, despite the majority opinion and attitudes, those who expressed more positive views on the Premier were females and better educated. Such a minority view indicates that there could be a relatively small shift in sections of the African community towards the Democratic Alliance.

Trust in the Provincial Government

The negative and lukewarm attitude on the part of eNkanini residents regarding trust in the provincial government mainly stems from the belief that the Democratic Alliance which is the ruling party in the province is a predominantly 'White party' that basically takes care of their voting constituencies comprising of the white and 'coloured' voters and do not pay serious attention to the key structural problems facing the Black African communities. The area is one of the strongholds of the ruling party's ANC Youth League and one of its historical leaders Andile Lili, who is very popular in a number of sections of the informal settlement that faces serious challenges such as lack of water, sanitation and facing municipality-led evictions. Such attitudes have been shaped by the belief that it is the provincial government that has been the force against continuous flows of migration to the area mainly from the Eastern Cape and is instrumental in evicting new residents. As it happens many of the evictees are related to the 'older' inhabitants in the area.

On the contrary, in Makhaya, it is evident that there is significantly more trust the provincial government. Such attitudes basically emanate mostly from females and relatively well educated respondents who justified their position with comparisons between the previous ANC led government,

both at provincial and local government levels. Their attitude was that the DA's governance was cleaner, less corrupt and efficient when compared to that of the ANC. There is a belief amongst these interviewees that what they describe as the 'tough action' the provincial and local government agents take towards the large numbers of newcomers and 'invaders' of urban spaces fair because congestion in informal settlement lead to diseases, higher crime rates, electricity theft that leads to continuous problems in Makhaya. There are strong similarities in the perceptions relating to the provincial government and the Premier, despite the fact that the negativity towards the Premier in the case of the informal settlement is much stronger.

Trust in the Hawks

The Hawks are the South African Police Services Directorate for Priority Crimes Investigation and the unit investigates on organised crime, economic crime, corruption and other serious crimes referred to it. It was established in 2019 (Woods & Mantzaris, 2012). The responses indicate that there is little knowledge of the unit amongst the majority of respondents especially in eNkanini, while they are better known in the middle-class area. In general, the attitudes are negative to lukewarm as the unit seems to be passing through a period of internal in-fighting and press negativity.

Trust in the South African Police Services (SAPS)

Although there are slight differences in the mistrust towards the police in comparative terms, this feeling is almost universal. This can be understood under the existing circumstance as residents in eNkanini face a daily situation of crime that takes different forms, such as house braking, murders, burglaries, and political in-fighting that have escalated over the years because of overcrowding, the new waves of prospective and hopeful dwellers. The situation has been described as 'very bad', 'terrible', 'unbearable' and 'deadly', and the general feeling is that 'SAPS do not care', 'they have no vehicles', 'the Harare police station is under-staffed' (the police station is situated very close to both areas). The residents in Section 23 in Makhaya have over the years faced significant increase in crime incidents and there has been a decision to organise self-styled and supported 'self- defence units'. These consist of housewives and young unemployed young men who occasionally patrol the areas and deal harshly with criminals or potential criminals.

Conclusions

The central aim of this research was to identify and analyse perceptions of vulnerable African people in the Western Cape in a comparative perspective, with special emphasis on those residing in an informal settlement within the City of Cape Town Metropolitan Municipality and a group in an established middle class area of the same township. The research relied on the knowledge that corruption permeates all echelons and sections/sectors of the public and private sectors, leading to a lack of trust and a deterioration of the functionality of the state. This weak state functionality leads to poor development at all societal levels, with severe social disadvantages for not only the poorest of the poor but also sections of the Black African middle classes. Both these social categories were represented in the study.

The perceptions, opinions and attitudes of ordinary people towards corruption and maladministration that have negative impact on good governance and socioeconomic rights is an important measurement by any standard and is directly related to the root causes of such attitudes. The key findings of the research signify almost conclusively that, despite the fact that the sampled social groups live under different conditions, they hold similar attitudes towards state institutions. While there have been small differences in a few instances, trust in the functions and the functionaries of the state, both political and administrative, has been eroded very significantly. This means that Black African people living in the same geographical area, under radically different and contrasting social conditions, have very similar attitudes beliefs and ideas on trust. This outcome can be attributed to how they feel the experience of corruption, bribery, irregularities, maladministration and the misuse of state resources, as these phenomena affect the quality of their lives both directly and indirectly.

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