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# Transportation of the Visegrad four: Potential ingredients for system change\*

Donald E. Fuller<sup>1</sup>

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## Abstract

Yehezkel Dror argues that government, as now constituted, is a failure.<sup>2</sup> Many would agree. His proposition for transformation resembles Havelian<sup>3</sup> transcendence: largely a top-down concept. The paper examines his thesis and its appropriateness for the Visegrad Four, if not wider. Using secondary sources, and the Visegrad Four as the units of analysis, the purpose is to dissect governance capacities, incentives, and plausible transforming characteristics to evaluate Dror's prescription for transforming governments from favoring *raison d'etat* to *raison d'humanite* (humanity). The paper evaluates according to three possible outcomes: strong possibility, very little possibility, and partial possibility.

## Key words:

## Introduction

Dror argues that two things have to happen: (1) societies must eschew government as usual and turn toward an enlightened, knowledge framework (2) government leaders must become 'benevolent despots' who will apply heightened morals and values to age-old problems as well as the new. He calculates that history shows it will not happen by itself, and (b), there is a small chance that it *will* happen but *without intervention* all societies will suffer immeasurably.

Since Plato (philosopher kings) and up through Havel's Velvet Revolution, it has been supposed that transcendence offers the greatest hope for strategic governance. History has not been kind to this approach that really is metaphysical. Plato finally capitulated to

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\* I thank the anonymous reviewer for providing constructive comments. This is a slightly revised version of a paper presented to the 15<sup>th</sup> Network of Institutes and Schools of Public Administration in Central and Eastern Europe (NISPAcee) Annual Conference, May 17-19, 2007, Kiev, Ukraine.

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<sup>2</sup> (2001), *The Capacity to Govern: A Report to the Club of Rome*, London/Portland, OR: Frank Cass, ISBN 0-7146-8314-0.

<sup>3</sup> Vaclav Havel, former president, Czech Republic.

contractual (legal) protections and frameworks; Havel finally had to abandon Civic Forum particularly since he conceived political parties as locked in conflict and state interest. Dror continues the hope, well aware that both in theory and in praxis, outcomes have not supported such norms.

## THEORY

Mankind, with few exceptions, has demurred from participative government, deferring to top-down, monopolistic, centralized, authoritarian decision models.<sup>4</sup> Hayek and Polanyi have argued that democracies do not extinguish the authoritarian tendency.<sup>5</sup> Przeworski contends that democracies can transition to authoritarian governments.<sup>6</sup> Dahl contends that democracies tend toward polyarchies that dissipate dispersion of authority and provide barriers against significant civil participation<sup>7</sup> (also see Putnam<sup>8</sup>). Huntington alleges that states “wave” democratically two steps forward and one backward (though this would imply some progress).<sup>9</sup> Michels asserts that all organizations transform into oligarchies.<sup>10</sup> Castells asserts, “The nation-state defining the domain, procedures, and object of citizenship, has lost much of its sovereignty, undermined by the dynamics of global flows and trans-organizational networks of wealth, information and power.”<sup>11</sup>

Essentially states seek a tradeoff between political democracy, market and state intervention, or even management, as well as social equity and equality. Along the way, efficiency and effectiveness congeal

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<sup>4</sup> Not to the surprise of Michels, R. in Grusky, O. and Miller, G.A. (1970) *The Sociology of Organizations: Basic Studies*, New York: Free Press, pp. 25-43, accessed on 11/19/08 at <http://media.pfeiffer.edu/~Iridener/courses/MICHELSR.HTML>, and Dahl, R. (1989), *Democracy and Its Critics*, New Haven/London: Yale University Press, ISBN 0-300-04938-2, pp. 225-231; see quick summary in Heywood, A. (1994), *Political Ideas and Concepts* (1994), London: Macmillan Press, ISBN 0-333-58352-3, pp. 80-82.

<sup>5</sup> Hayek, F. (1944, 1972), *The Road to Serfdom*, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, ISBN 0-226-32061-8; Karl Polanyi (1944, 1957), *The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time*, Boston: Beacon Press by arrangement with Rinehart and Company, Inc., New York/Toronto., ISBN 080705643X.

<sup>6</sup> (1991), *Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America*, Cambridge, UK/New York Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, ISBN 0-521-42335-X.

<sup>7</sup> Dahl, R., op. cit.

<sup>8</sup> Putnam, R. (1993), *Making Democracy Work: Traditions in Modern Italy*, Princeton University Press, ISBN- 13: 978-0691037387.

<sup>9</sup> Huntington, S.P. (1991), *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century* Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, ISBN 0-8061-2516-0.

<sup>10</sup> Michels, R., op. cit.

<sup>11</sup> Castells, M. (1997, 2004a), *The Power of Identity, The Information Age: Economy, Society and Culture*, Vol. II, 2<sup>nd</sup> ed., Malden, MA/Oxford, UK: Blackwell, p.402.

arguments for input/output considerations. The most recent, somewhat post-modern iteration, is that of the knowledge society.<sup>12</sup> This iteration prescribes public policy as inevitably linked to 'new meaning' anchored in pragmatic applications of the scientific method. Conflict is reduced to input/output equations tempered by transcendence of life sustaining and improving values.<sup>13</sup>

The paper questions two major prescriptions of Dror: (1) that transcendence is possible in political systems inherently embedded in power, and (2) that hierarchical models have any continuing usefulness in societal decision models except for extinguishing fires, subduing riots or waging war, though Iraq illustrates the confines of post-modern warfare: insurgency or guerilla warfare.

Reflexivity suggests that leaders are **incapable** of resisting power incentives. Philosopher kings, absolute kings, presidents, prime ministers, chiefs of corporations, ideologues, criminals, and most politicians **resist** negotiation, compromise, enlightened and shared decision making. While one can argue that the launching of a nuclear warhead leaves little time for negotiation and decision reflexivity, most political decisions are not so inured. President Kennedy found it possible to avoid group think by using a committee of experts over a precious few days during the Cuban missile crisis. Sufficient time existed (or was taken). Short of police, fire and military explosions, leaders have not established a **continuing** process for group mediation of strategic decisions or even tactical decisions. Rather, one can argue the process has been attenuated and discussed by a chosen few. Absolute kings failed to reach transcendence other than to satisfy their own appetites. The only action checking empires of the Romans, Ottomans, Habsburgs, Russians, French, British, Portuguese, Germans, Soviets and Americans has been that of resistance. The search for a benevolent despot seems hopeless. Prototypes such as Gandhi and Martin Luther King were assassinated. It is not that the public disavows such leaders. Entrenched power, however, is threatened by mediators seeking to upset the power balance.


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<sup>12</sup> See United Nations, New York (2005), "Understanding Knowledge Societies: In Twenty Questions and Answers with the Index of Knowledge Societies," Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Division for Public Administration and Development Management.

<sup>13</sup> Schepers, S. (2007), "Europe; Cultural Revolution: The Only Way to Cut through The EU's Red Tape Jungle," *Europe's World*, accessed on 11/24/08 at <http://www.europesworld.org/EWSettings/Article/tabid/191/ArticleType/articleview/ArticleID/20343/Default.aspx>, "...kings no longer rule by divine right and the ideology of the state as the sole source of the public interest has been lost in the post-World War II turmoil of economic and social change."

In Dror's review of past leaders, his only example is Lee Kuan Yew of Singapore. Most observers view Lee as having been skilled in opposing the British and Malaysians yet authoritarian in constructing a society.<sup>14</sup> His acceptance of dissent has been miniscule. Dror provides no other example. In the absence of *benevolent* despots, social science must question their viability. Kings have been eliminated by constitutional monarchies; dictators have been eliminated by resistance or death. We retain elected leaders with the normative assumption that authoritarianism cannot exist within a democracy. Most minorities would reject that argument. It is inherent in majority/minority conflicts that dialogue and compromise must occur. Gandhi was a proponent of non-violence as was M.L. King. Both were successful despite violence occurring in their paths (for example, communal riots in post-independence India/Pakistan). The current race between China and India to establish hegemony in political models is clearly marked by a managed/administered system vs. a *laissez faire* system. We can learn from both systems though each has its imperfections. Can there be a substitute for the ultimate decision maker eschewing opposing views and coopting surrounding adversaries in state self-interest?<sup>15</sup> Let us look at the schematic for the paper's analysis.

**Figure 1: Schematic for paper's analysis**



<sup>14</sup> Huntington (1991), op. cit., pp. 197, 202.

<sup>15</sup> See Moravcsik, A. (2004), "Is There a 'Democratic Deficit' in World Politics? A Framework for Analysis," *Government and Opposition Ltd.*, Oxford/Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 39, 2 (April): 336-363.

<sup>16</sup> Events in the 19<sup>th</sup> century cluster around changes in laws and norms affecting work, wages, prices, relief and suffrage; changes in the 20<sup>th</sup> century center upon 1989 in what is now the Visegrad Four (then Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland). We refer to it as the Velvet Revolution though this was originally attached only to Czechoslovakia.

<sup>17</sup> We use Hirschman's model of voice/exit/loyalty and modify it to voice/exit/violence. We add violence as an intervening variable in order to reduce force/coercion as a **major** cause in the changes. We want to exclude armed revolutions/insurrections as representing a different genre. We want to concentrate on power changes that are *relatively* non-violent. The history of armed revolutions/insurrections is too clouded with temporary forcible change often leading to later backtracking.

THEORY, METHODOLOGY, DATA

- Theory is drawn from Polanyi,<sup>18</sup> Hayek,<sup>19</sup> Michels<sup>20</sup> and Castells<sup>21</sup>; methodology is drawn from Hirschman<sup>22</sup>; data are drawn largely from Polanyi,<sup>23</sup> Hobsbawm<sup>24</sup> and Ash.<sup>25</sup> Also see website citations in references.



COMPARE 19TH AND 20<sup>TH</sup> CENTURY MATERIAL FOR TRACES OF TRANSCENDENCE/GROUP ACTIVITY

- We seek any pattern that might exist in both time periods.

FIT FACTS TO VOICE/EXIT/VIOLENCE MODEL

- We use the Hirschman<sup>26</sup> model as a template against which to compare the two time periods.



**FINDINGS: IN BOTH CASES; LARGELY NON-VIOLENT, CONVERGING OPINIONS; NON-ZERO-SUM GAMES AND MULTIPLE TIME LINES; PARTIAL EVIDENCE OF TRANSCENDENCE; LARGELY CHANGE-LED AS CONDITIONS DEEPENED OR WIDENED**

- We find a pattern that is repeated despite the passing of 250 years.



CAN'T RULE OUT SOME TRANSCENDENCE THOUGH SUBSTANTIALLY MORE EVIDENCE OF GROUPS ACTING IN CONCERT; NO APPARENT BACKTRACKING

- We can hardly dismiss transcendence in its entirety in view of examples such as Gandhi, Vaclav Havel and Martin Luther King. We conclude, however, that they were rare exceptions (Nelson Mandela might well be added to this elite group).

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<sup>18</sup> (1957), op.cit.

<sup>19</sup> (1944, 1972), op.cit.

<sup>20</sup> In Grusky, O. and Miller, G.A. (1970), op.cit.

<sup>21</sup> Castells, M. (1977, 2004), op.cit. and Castells, M. (1997b), *The End of The Millenium,, The Information Age: Economy, Society and Culture*, Vol. III, 2<sup>nd</sup> ed., Cambridge, MA/Oxford, UK: Blackwell, ISBN 0-631-22140-9.

<sup>22</sup> Hirschman, A.O. (1970), *Exit, Voice, and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations and States*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press; also see Ross, M.H. (1985), "Political Organization and Political Participation: Exit, Voice, and Loyalty in Preindustrial Societies," *Comparative Politics*, Vol. 21, No. 1, October, pp. 73-89.

<sup>23</sup> (1957), op.cit.

<sup>24</sup> Hobsbawm, E.J. (1991), *The Age of Revolution: Europe, 1789-1848*, London: Sphere Books, Ltd., ISBN 0-7474 0290 6

<sup>25</sup> Ash, T.G. (1990, 1999), *We The People: The Revolution of '89 Witnessed in Warsaw, Budapest, Berlin and Prague*, London: Penguin Books.

<sup>26</sup> Hirschman, A.O. (1970), op.cit.

## **POLANYI**

Karl Polanyi described a series of 19<sup>th</sup> century policy issues that eventually resulted in solution. That, of course, does not forestall later changes. However, the *concepts* were debated and resolved by a series of discussions resulting in mutual consensus. It is possible to conceive of those in the *status quo* as conservatives; those urging reform as liberals. Yet that would not be entirely useful. Each side had occasion to fashion a solution. For normative reasons the other side may have been in opposition. The illustrative point is that after substantial time elapsed, *both sides were able to find consensus in favor of reform.* Thus, an intersection of interests particularly occurring after elapsed time propelled the argument toward resistance, negotiation and consensus.<sup>27</sup> The new policy was, as usual, based on new normative concerns buttressed by the possibility of unintended consequence(s). This paper argues that this convergence of thinking resulted not only from converging normative space. Reform occurred in view of consensus on the *solution* resounding to ***different*** policy rationales, most often anchored oppositely on the conservative vs. liberal side or vice versa. A current example would include welfare payments. The Swedes constructed their original concept of transcendent policy for welfare by supporting citizens with budgetary transfer payments. Current thinking focuses on providing jobs and/or job training to make the welfare recipient *less dependent on the state*. The consensus, then, becomes win/win. The conservatives applaud returning the welfare recipient to *taxable* employment. The liberals support separating the recipient from a continuing *dependency* on the state. We extract several of Polanyi's (and others) observations and place them in our own format. We test the issues normatively; we seek a pattern either of transcendency or the converse, resistance, horizontal or vertical bargaining.

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<sup>27</sup> Castells, M. (1997, 2004a), op.cit.



**Table 1: POLANYI'S OBSERVATIONS.**

Events	Issue(s)	Consequence	Reform Solution
Speenhamland, 1795	"Right to live:" provided a subsidy to labor based on price of bread, regardless of wages earned.	Labor avoided low wages and accepted 'rates' (subsidies from the govt.); eventually no one worked since wages lower than the 'rates'	Abolished the law in 1834.
Anti-Corn Law Agitation, 1846	This was to repeal tariffs on British agriculture that would lower the price of bread; came about due to widespread Leagues agitating vs. corn (wheat and other grains) laws that protected farmers and tenants. .	Prime Minister Sir Robert Peel (Tory) forced on the defensive between Tories and widespread pressure to lessen tariffs; Tories thought he was deserting them; Whigs wanted repeal.	Bill passed (1846) by a combination of Conservatives, Whigs and free traders. Wellington steered it though the Lords. Aristocracy survived, heading off other reform bills to a later date.
Poor Law Reform Act, 1834	Excluded working class from relief and distinguished them from paupers	Government wanted to reduce cost of relief for the poor; based on less eligibility; relief given only within workhouses that were to deter all but the most needy by creating worse conditions than	Outdoor relief (outside workhouses) discouraged but not abolished; cyclical unemployed reluctant to enter workhouses in order to obtain aid; first established outside

		outside; rural poor migrated to jobs in urban areas causing increased urban poor rates	parliament; later transferred to Parliam. Committee; seemed to many as rich reestablishing control; opposed by workers, politicians and religious leaders.
Ten Hours Bill (1847)	Question of fixing hours for employment of women and children in mills and factories	Wide support existed in both houses despite earlier defeat in January 1846. Particularly supported by clergy and Conservatives; had probably satisfied the growing Chartist movement though much would be heard in the near future from Chartism	Act of 1850 imposed stricter limits on hours since “relays” of operatives kept mills open during legal work limits: 5:30 am – 8:30 pm. Finally returned to a 10 ½ hour day and 60 hour week; working day became 6 am-6 pm.
Luddism	Luddites objected to introduction of wide-framed looms that could be operated by cheap, unskilled labor causing loss of jobs for many textile workers; exacerbated	Ultimately meaning broadened to include opposition to technology threatening worker self-preservation and set prices.	Eventually breaking machines became capital crime; some were executed, some sent to Australia. Later simply part of growing worker unrest and agitation for labor reform.

	work hardships during Napoleonic Wars.		
Owenite Movement	Inevitably man must be protected against the market	Owen believed that incentives were more important than coercion. He hoped to establish a utopian setting for workers. His experiments, with the exception of adapting an existing Fordist model, were unsuccessful.	Owen's New Lanark experiments essentially laid down the design and construction of a social setting in order to maximize production and worker happiness. It failed. To some extent, this utopian construction resembled the psychological framework for future communism. Despite its planning, it assumed man wants to be organized for the greater good. Apparently they did not.
Chartism, 1848	Inevitably man must be protected against the market	Disaffected lower middle and upper working classes not given suffrage in 1832; sought suffrage for all men over age 21; elimination	Radicals joined with Whigs and anti-protectionist Tories to form Liberal Party by 1859. Finally, Disraeli's Reform Act of 1867 almost doubled the

		of property requirement; secret ballot; caused agitation, strikes and unrest; movement eventually dissipated but enjoined by middle class Radicals in Parliament.	electorate, giving the vote to working men and the secret ballot (1872). Some believe the labor movement and unions would be the next step.
Parliamentary Reform Act, 1832	This was a suffrage bill: The Tories opposed increasing the numbers of voters; Whig Prime Minister Grey wanted to increase representation in fast-growing industrial cities.	It was Whigs vs. Tories. It first failed passage. Grey asked the King to appoint more Whig Lords. Still failed. The Duke of Wellington (Tory) has replaced Grey but could not form a cabinet. Grey returned, asked the King again for more Whig Lords.	Bill finally passed: only one in seven adult males could vote; property ownership was mandatory; constituencies quite unequal in size; essentially extended suffrage to the middle classes.
Enclosure Movement	Fencing the land to convert common land to private ownership. Grazing of tenants might be permitted between crops. Secondly, common fens and marshes, moor and other uninhabited	Issue was a shift in beliefs from "common wealth" (common livelihoods) versus "public good" (wealth of the nation or GDP). Elites favored enclosure; small landholders and tenants were	Potential for increased tax base prevented enclosure reform; only Soviet collectivization acted against ownership by kulaks. Meanwhile, non-property owners forced to move to cities and

	places that had been common land might be converted into owned land.	opposed.	seek work.
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Sources: Polanyi (1944,1957), pp. 40-41, 71-82, 138-150, 163-177, 223-226, 280-286, 293; Hobsbawm (1991), pp. 42-72, 138-163, 187-206.

NOTES:

1. **Ten Hours Bill.** Marx hailed this as the first victory of socialism. Polanyi comments that “it was the work of enlightened reactionaries.”<sup>28</sup>

2. **Owenite Movement and Chartism.** “Both movements comprised hundreds of thousands of craftsmen and artisans, laborers and working people...among the biggest social movement in modern history....Different as they were and similar only in their failure, they served to prove how inevitable from the first (was) the necessity of protecting man against the market.”<sup>29</sup>

3. **Owenism.** “...if only the right method was found, man’s existence could be restored...Owenism was a religion of industry the bearer of which was the working class...Practically, it was the beginning of the modern trade union movement.”<sup>30</sup>

4. **Owen** “turned away from a Christianity that renounced the task of mastering the world of man...instead of facing the awful revelation that *transcended*<sup>31</sup> the New Testament.”

5. **Chartism.** “Working classes were in a position to force ruinous interventions. This was a source of fear. Reactions of the working class and peasantry to market economy both led to protectionism (as *current outsourcing*); labor (movement) led to social legislation and factory laws; peasantry to agrarian tariffs and land laws; in emergency, farmers defended market system which labor endangered. Social strata on land inclined to compromise with the market system; labor did not shrink from breaking its rules and challenging it.”<sup>32</sup>

<sup>28</sup> Polanyi (1944, 1957), op. cit., p. 166; Hobsbawm, E.J. (1991) , op. cit.

<sup>29</sup> Polanyi (1944, 1957), op.cit., p. 167.

<sup>30</sup> Ibid.. p. 168.

<sup>31</sup> My emphasis.

<sup>32</sup> Polanyi, (1944, 1957), op.cit., p. 197.

**6. Speenhamland.** Faced with substandard wages, particularly in rural areas, the government subsidy

“When the gallon loaf of bread of definite quality ‘shall cost 1 shilling, then every poor and industrious person shall have for his support 3 shillings...’” With or without wages, the rates were paid. Thus, life was determined by the price of bread that consistently exceeded wages paid. The ‘right to live’ thus, prevented development of a competitive labor market. A person could make a living by “doing nothing.”<sup>33</sup> Not until 1834 (with the Poor Law Reform) was the law abolished. This presaged the 20<sup>th</sup> century problem of trading off minimum wage, actual wage, and welfare support. Initially the law was very popular. Eventually, those whom it was to provide relief, became injured rather than relieved. Ultimately, the *paternalistic* gesture attempting to prevent the proletarianization of common people resulted in “pauperization of the masses.”<sup>34</sup> This pre-market protection attacked the *dignity* of working individuals while emasculating a potential labor market, hindering production. Accordingly, those on the paternalistic left found support among producers on the right. Only the true paupers were left.

**7. Poor Law Reform.** This became a transition to the market economy. This was the beginning of the dilemma between unemployment and welfare. The dichotomy was not understood at this time (perhaps even now). Because of economic financial drain caused by the Napoleonic War and the onset of the Industrial Revolution workers often suffered from low wages, high prices and job uncertainty. **Luddism** was a natural consequence of economic fear. The rich failed to distinguish the unemployed worker from the potential welfare recipient. They called them both “poor.” In fact the rich believed there were only two classes: the rich and everybody else. Speenhamland had implied that anyone working was either poor or did not want to work: essentially the same to the rich. In order to get welfare (relief) one had to go to the workhouse, an intolerable institution. Thus, it was assumed that an able-bodied unemployed would not want to enter the workhouse but would find work. The rate received under Speenhamland was insufficient to maintain a family. Secondly, the able-bodied worker did not want to qualify as poor and enter the workhouse. For status reasons, unemployed

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<sup>33</sup> Ibid., p. 78.

<sup>34</sup> Ibid., p. 82.

workers eschewed the poorhouse. They were then trapped: no work; no money; and no dignity

8. **Anti-Corn Legislation.** This was a struggle between landholders and everyone else. The Corn Laws (actually corn, wheat and other grains) had been enacted to protect barons, landholders and other feudals. Without protective tariffs, French wheat would have crossed the Channel at lower prices. Of course, this struggle continues today in the World Trade Organization. The only party not particularly represented today is the consumer. In earlier days, the price of bread affected everyone but the rich. It became a political issue originally opposed by conservatives (Tories) yet eventually coalescing some Conservatives, Whigs and free traders. The aristocracy finally yielded hoping to put off further reforms that were now generating interest among consumers, workers and the common man in general.
9. **Enclosure Movement.** Farming had been done in strips. This permitted certain strips to lie fallow while crops were rotated to other strips. Usually there were no fences. The land was accepted (more or less) as common. Tenants or others could graze their animals on the fallow strips apparently finding sufficient stalks on which to maintain themselves. Further, moors, marshes and other uninhabited places could also be used for grazing. **Enclosures** then appeared as the price of land gradually increased. Landholders believed they could increase productivity by protecting their land from intruders as well as scourges of insects or other assumed conveyors of unhappiness. Thus, many, who were not landholders, suffered losses of income from elimination of grazing, and conceivably stealth of crops. Thus, private farming was born as opposed to “common wealth.”
10. **Parliamentary Reform Act, 1832.** This was the struggle over universal suffrage. Since Plato’s time, property was the requirement for suffrage (and male gender). The struggle was now over increasing the vote not only in fast-growing cities but to address the inequality of the denial of suffrage to non-property holders and women. Again the Tories and Whigs held opposite views. After losing the first vote, the Whigs repeated their request to the King to appoint more Whig Lords (the vote of both Houses was needed) since many Lords would have preferred the status quo. Finally, the King relented and suffrage went to one in seven adult males though some property ownership was necessary;

many in the developing middle class could muster something of value to register.

## **COALESCING.AND SUMMARIZING, EX ANTE**

The paper argues that the nine examples above illustrate a pattern of resistance, negotiation, competition and non-zero-sum shifts in political power<sup>35</sup>. This comports with Polanyi's thesis that **political economy and society are interdependent**. Each interacts on the other. However there is a second point: that ideology can shift when politicians seek to resolve power conflicts. More succinctly, ideology, or even transcendence, can work at the margins to minimize losses while retaining some core elements. Capitalists need workers; workers need capitalists. The third point is created by the intersection of interests from opposing players whose values differ. Thus, socialists and capitalists can find space in the bargaining zone on which to agree. Except for Robert Owen, bargaining space existed in eight of nine examples.<sup>36</sup> For Robert Owen, it was zero-sum. Let him do it. He did and failed. But the *system* (utopia) imploded. His ideas are not forgot. Owen's New Lanark illustrated the 'free rider problem:' Some will work and the rest will let them. Stalinists (and to a lesser extent, Leninists) tried to solve the problem with coercion. Trotsky and Kerensky had less coercive ideas. They became earmarked. A wage increase reduces capitalist margins, transfers more income to workers, while at the same time reducing the hatred of organized labor. Marx wrote to Engels, "The English proletariat is actually becoming more and more bourgeois...so that the ultimate aim of this most bourgeois of all nations would appear to be the possession, alongside the bourgeois, of a bourgeois aristocracy and a bourgeois proletariat."<sup>37</sup>

We search Table One's observations for a pattern of conclusions that may help in model building. We array them as follows, using Hirschman's voice/exit model:

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<sup>35</sup> Non-zero-sum since though there were winners and losers, the losers actually lost in the status quo but won strength in perpetuating aspects of the system: capitalists perpetuated the market system; workers increased wages; suffrage broadened..

<sup>36</sup> Franklin Roosevelt who spearheaded Social Security, Unemployment Pay, welfare, CCC Camps and regulation of big business, opined: "...they all hate me. And I welcome their hatred." Quoted in Krugman (2007), "Do Not Fear the Hatred," *International Herald Tribune*, January 27-28.

<sup>37</sup> Heilbroner, R.L. (1992), *The Worldly Philosophers: The Lives, Times and Ideas of the Great Economic Thinkers*, 6<sup>th</sup> ed., New York: Simon and Schuster, p. 172, ISBN 0-671-63318X.



**Table 2**

Events	Resistance dynamics	Parties	Key Ingredient
Speenhamland	Voice	Unemployed vs. elites	Subsidies to the poor
Anti-Corn Law	Voice	Consumers vs. landholders and farmers	Protective tariffs
Poor Law Reform	Voice	Unemployed and poor vs. elites	Workhouse relief only
Ten Hours Bill	Voice	Workers, particularly women and children	No. of working hours
Luddism	Voice	Workers vs. factory owners	Technology
Owenite movement	Exit	Work incentives vs. Leviathan	Pull vs. push
Chartism	Voice	Workers vs. elites	Suffrage for workers
Parliamentary Reform Act	Voice	Workers vs. elites	Property ownership broadened for suffrage
Enclosure Movement	Voice	Landholders vs. tenants/non-landholders	Fencing land

**PATTERNS**

Table Two's nine events illustrate a pattern: that of voice/exit. That is not to say that violence was entirely absent. Imprisonment occurred. Executions occurred. Occasional deaths resulting from agitation occurred. However, this was not civil war. The events illustrated a transition of political, economic and social change. Excepting the Owenite Movement, the dynamic was resistance by voice: asserting a position against political power. Owenites opted out. They sought a new model: utopia. It worked while embedded within a Fordist model. New

Lanark in America caused its demise. Pure utopia was too much for the model.

**Politics.** The issue was suffrage. Property holders had the right to vote and non-property owners did not. Attempts at gaining suffrage were stopped by elites, particularly by conservatives. The fear was the **majority** would vote against the **minority** elites. (James Madison had the same fear in America). Yet in the wake of the French Revolution, particularly resonant to Jean Jacques Rousseau and Thomas Paine, the issues of human rights were flagged as a constitutional necessity even in a constitutional monarchy. It was assumed that suffrage was essential. Since the majority was the consuming public, it clashed with minority landholders. Although eventually one in seven workers were to vote, property remained a problem. A developing middle class found means to register property as many increased incomes due to the Industrial Revolution.

**Economy.** The Industrial Revolution increased demand dependent on an adequate labor supply. Yet there was not an institutional labor market. Wages were dictated by industry. Working conditions were difficult and created by factory owners, there being no protective laws. In this climate, Speenhamland acted against the interests of elites since it poisoned the desire for low wages when the 'rates' (relief) topped up a wage if found to be below a set formula for the price of wheat (bread). Ultimately, labor floundered and factories faced continued labor shortages; as supply responded (slowly) to demand, wages inevitably increased and working conditions improved. It was a continuing struggle that eventually moved into Parliament (both Houses). Labor and its supporters (Whigs and Liberals) realized suffrage would strengthen labor rights. Thus, against the wishes of conservatives and property holders, labor reform commenced.

### **Social.**

England's income and riches lay primarily with a small minority. This time period was largely pre-market, certainly pre-labor market. Supply and demand varied. In the face of antagonistic workers, factories turned toward technology to increase productivity. Thus, Luddism caused civil and criminal actions inherent in change from some degree of job certainty, particularly among the guilds. Failure to recognize the difference between unemployment and non-employables, emerged from attitudes of the rich who proselytized that a person not working preferred to live off the 'rates.' By requiring that relief could only be earned in workhouses, what dignity remained within the unemployed turned to

anger and resistance. The rest of society, watching bread prices increasing from protective tariffs sympathized with laborers vs. the rich. As a result, the struggle subsequently set the foundation for the labor movement: political, economic and social, as ultimately the union movement emerged as a countervailing force to that of factory owners and conservative politics. Emerging suffrage slowly changed social strata and contributed to class consciousness.

**VOICE, EXIT AND VIOLENCE.<sup>38</sup>**

In order to ascertain the time dimension of voice/exit and violence in Table One’s nine examples we chart them below. We need to isolate them from the Good Samaritan example (acting quickly in an emergency) and further determine that the outcome was determined by neither substantial violence nor coercion. We argue that by selecting examples from the early 19<sup>th</sup> century sufficient time has elapsed to isolate a confounding variable or retroactive decision back toward an earlier set of conditions. We expect to find that the nine examples were not emergencies; were essentially not insurrections or mini revolutions such that the reforms involved a clear struggle between one group vs. another. It is argued that both the aggrieved and the “aggrieved” constituted **groups** whose interests were at stake and not passively following transcendent leaders. There *were* leaders but our thrust is that both the aggrieved and their opposition had respective causes in agitating for their interests and to empower themselves.

**Table 3.**

Event	Time period	Groups involved	Violence/non-violence
Speenhamland	An amendment to the old Poor Law (or Elizabethan Poor Law); influenced by Britain’s involvement in French Wars (1793-1815); lasted until 1834, with passing of 1834 PoorLaw. <b>Time period: 41 years</b>	Unemployed and poor vs. local governments and farmers in absence of national law; wage subsidy caused reduction in farm labor’s wages.	Hobsbawm (1962): violations of arson, offences vs. property and rioting: “savagely repressed” in 1830s (p. 203); thus, the status quo forces exerted the violence.

<sup>38</sup> Albert O. Hirschman (1970), op.cit.; Scott Gehlbach (2005), “A Political Model of Exit and Voice,” accessed on 11/23/08, at <http://www.polisci.wisc.edu/users/pevehous/exitvoice3.pdf> ; we have added “violence” to the model: see fn 16.

<p>Anti-Corn Law Agitation</p>	<p>1841-1846. <b>Time period: 5 years.</b></p>	<p>Anti-Corn Law League, including two MPs (Cobden and Bright) vs. Prime Minister Sir Robert Peel's<sup>39</sup> Conservative Tory Government, landlords and protectionists (to retain tariffs): thus, agrarians vs. industrialists.</p>	<p>Poor harvests contributed to high wheat prices; no reports of unusual violence; Hobsbawm comments, "...500,000 handloom weavers did (starve)" (p. 57; Further, "agricultural depression of 1815 reduced the rural poverty to demoralizing destitution." (p. 65).</p>
<p>Poor Law Amendment Act, 1834</p>	<p>(1832-34) <b>Two years.</b> (but amended Poor Law of 1601) Later transferred implementation from Commission to Parliament</p>	<p>Poor and unemployed vs. Poor Law Commission and local parish governments (subsequently called 'unions').</p>	<p>Rural poor abandoned several rural counties creating "absolute" loss of population.<sup>40</sup> "At least a million Britons remained paupers up to (1848) and the (situation) did not substantially improve until the 1850s."<sup>41</sup></p>
<p>Ten Hours Bill</p>	<p>(1844-1848). <b>Four years.</b></p>	<p>Broad section of society including two Tory Anglicans, a Tory Wesleyan, an Anglican Parson, a Liberal Quaker, some manufacturers, two liberal MPs, many bishops )House of Lords), ministers of all religious denominations vs. operatives of the mills.</p>	<p>Evasion of the Act caused agitation and several judicial test cases; Act slightly amended maximizing weekly hours at 60 rather than the earlier 58.</p>
<p>Luddism</p>	<p>(1811-1817) Activity . had occurred as early as 1675 and continued in later periods as technology was added to the workplace. General hardships attributed to the Napoleonic wars <b>Six years.</b></p>	<p>Workers, particularly textile workers that increased depending on the introduction of labor saving devices vs. mill owners and manufacturers.</p>	<p>Government suppressed agitators; battles occurred vs. army; "machine breaking (industrial sabotage) was made a <i>capital crime</i>; 17 men executed in a trial in York (1813); many others transported to Australia; Luddites ambushed mill-owner and were hanged. Thus, the government</p>

<sup>39</sup> <http://www.victorianweb.org/history/cornlaws2.html>, accessed on 11/27/08.

<sup>40</sup> Hobsbawm (1991), op. cit., p. 188.

<sup>41</sup> Ibid, p. 203.

			responded to force with force. Luddism started to wane about this time
Owenite Movement	(1790-1858). <b>Sixty eight years.</b>	Owen did not become an enlightened despot nor did his philosophy gain wide acceptance; eventually it attracted some combatants; he ran successful factories but like many others felt society would embrace socialism as most rational; he did not become a political activist and his followers were inclined toward cooperatives. No group actively opposed him other than philosophically. He was as close to <b>transcendancy</b> as any of our other examples.	No violence reported by his followers or the factory owners or society in general.
Chartism	Reform Act of 1832 to 1854. <b>Twenty two years.</b>	Wide range of organizations many of which were labeled "radical" by 1838: six members of Parliament and six working men set up a committee that published <i>People's Charter</i> , essentially arguing for universal suffrage for all men over age 21; eliminate Property Qualification for Parliament; secret ballot and other demands. Many associations and Chartist Centres materialized; petition presented to Parliament (1839); petition refused. Eventually led to battle with Army. May, 1842, another petition submitted <i>with over three million</i> signatures: rejected by Parliament;	Several outbreaks of violence leading to several arrests and trials. A brief, bloody battle occurred in Newport. Shots were fired. Twenty killed and 20 wounded and Chartists retreated. After 2 <sup>nd</sup> petition (1842), leaders were arrested along with 1500 others: 79 people sentenced to from 7-21 years; after 3 <sup>rd</sup> petition, army was ready and result was peaceful.

		depression of 1841-1842 led to wave of strikes. Chartists stood in elections; 3 <sup>rd</sup> petition (1848): almost two million signatures yet some appeared to be forgeries such as "Queen Victoria." Movement petered out but most demands ultimately accepted by 1872.	
Parliamentary Reform Act, 1832	(1830-1832) <b>Two years.</b> From 1770-1830, Tories had been in power, opposed to extending suffrage to more people. In 1830, Earl Grey, a Whig became Prime Minister. He persuaded William IV to dissolve Parliament in a move to increase the Whig majority. Grey argued that the Whig proposals would eliminate certain "rotten boroughs" and give the leading industrial towns greater representation in the Parliament. The Whigs were successful in the House of Commons but the House of Lords remained with the Tories and that House defeated the bill. Several riots ensued, the most serious in Bristol. Ultimately the Whigs were successful particularly after the King appointed additional Whigs to the House of Lords.	Whigs vs. Tories. Sir Robert Peel, a Tory, refused to join a Tory govt. that intended to vitiate the suffrage bill that drew substantial support in Britain. This prevented the Duke of Wellington from forming a Tory govt. and the Whigs ultimately succeeded. But the resulting act was disappointing, having still included an element of property holding assumedly limited to petit bourgeois. The break of middle class radicals with the extreme left "was to happen after the revolution." <sup>42</sup>	Had been a July revolution in France in 1830. Hobsbawm states that the British followed the French (for once) somewhat uniquely. However, it was not a revolution rather than separate geographic revolts. Both Whigs and Tories succeeded in restraining a full blown revolution. <sup>43</sup> Thus, Britain was now a constitutional monarchy in which property created an oligarchic parliament despite additional suffrage for those with some property qualifications (voting in boroughs required a home with an annual value of 10 pounds). <sup>44</sup>
Enclosure	Enclosures existed as	Largely rural farm	Deaths were reported in

<sup>42</sup> Ibid., p. 154.

<sup>43</sup> Ibid., p. 142.

<sup>44</sup> As modified by the 1867 Reform Act, accessed on 11/23/08, at [http://www.atomseek.com/Encyclopedias/Spartans\\_Educational/Reform\\_of\\_Parliament/index.html](http://www.atomseek.com/Encyclopedias/Spartans_Educational/Reform_of_Parliament/index.html).

<p>Movement</p>	<p>early as the 12<sup>th</sup> century and by 1801, the Inclosure Consolidation Act was passed that addressed individual regions with various specification. Most enclosure acts were swept away by acts during 1760-1830.</p> <p><b>Seventy years.</b></p> <p>Farming was already for the market. The British “peasantry” had migrated to urban locations having been “diffused throughout an unfeudal countryside.”<sup>45</sup></p> <p>“Some 5,000 “enclosures” under the private and general Enclosure Acts broke up some six million acres of common fields and common lands from 1760 onwards (and) transformed them into private holdings...”<sup>46</sup></p>	<p>laborers vs. landholders, although certain families joined in skirmishes against others. The Newton Rebellion on June 8, 1607, caused rioting against the gentry. Forty-fifty were killed and leaders were hanged and quartered.</p>	<p>the Newton Rebellion. Nevertheless, the agricultural economy eventually changed to raising sheep for wool since this required few laborers. Thus, while agitation did occur, the market that was developing forced many laborers off the land and into the towns. Poverty among rural laborers was high though it would remain troubling even in the towns.</p>
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Theoretically, transcendent leaders might be possible to create (nature) or to breed (nurture) transcendent societies. History, however, is not encouraging. History offers signs that groups of individuals, among which may be a leader, are capable of sorting out existential problems without metaphysical/ideological arguments. When M.L. King was urged by certain of his supporters to obtain weapons, he replied that the police had more weapons than they did. We do not test the hypothesis that guerrilla warfare is more potent than non-violence.<sup>47</sup> We tend, however, to be less sanguine about the possibility of transcendent leaders than

<sup>45</sup> Hobsbawm (1962), op. cit., pp. 46-47.

<sup>46</sup> Ibid., p. 188.

<sup>47</sup> A current day tactic that was less prevalent in the 19<sup>th</sup> century; though during the American Revolution, American insurgents fought in both guerrilla modes as well as more vulnerable modes. Our examples seem more relevant to demonstrations and perhaps, insurgencies. The government typically responded with police/military tactics. But the paper is not arguing that force was the deciding factor. These movements, despite some force, were embedded in political/economic/social transformation.

groups willing to mount resistance against destructive forces, either among the majority or the minority.

## **THEORY RELATED TO PRAXIS**

As we attempt to locate Dror's transcendence closest to historical lessons, we are inclined to observe transformations in the past. Huntington speaks of "two steps forward and one back."<sup>48</sup> Przeworski speaks of socialism as unworkable and capitalism as illogical. O. Susa<sup>49</sup> suggests that the world is networking (Castells<sup>50</sup>) and is likely through information technology (IT) to become more tolerant of diversity and accept change that is not entirely self-serving. He admits, however, that information is controlled by media oligarchies and that network power may be horizontal equity to *different* levels, such that there is a *vertical* hierarchy of levels. This approaches Wallerstein's world system theory. The paper argues that the closest theoretical construct to progress lies within concepts of Hayek and Karl Polanyi with touches of Michels and Castells on the side. We defer metaphysics and move toward pragmatism.

We are skeptical that transcendence has often asserted itself in history rather than yielding to extraordinary conditions. Polanyi, in particular, shows how ideologues on both sides of the aisle may agree to change a policy for different reasons because a values intersection occurs in converging on a solution. Polanyi refers to abandonment of welfare payments to the poor since it resulted in eliminating incentives to work. The rich favored abandonment since it ate up tax money; the liberals favored it since it removed labor's dependence on the state. There are other examples. Having agreed with Dror that history tends to eschew transcendence, the paper disagrees that the likelihood of either 'naturing' or 'nurturing' is plausible. Not always, however. There may be a scintilla of evidence reverberating from Gandhi and M.L. King. The shift from *raison d'etat* to *raison d' humanite* has not been entirely absent. As a model for the majority of cases, however, the transformation withers in the face of political expediency (*raison d'etat*).

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<sup>48</sup> Huntington (1991), op. cit.

<sup>49</sup> Susa, O. (undated), "Risks-Learning in a Global Cosmopolis: Information, Citizenship and Global Cosmopolitanism," Institute of Philosophy, Czech Academy of Sciences; Department of Sociology, Charles University, Prague, susa@lorien.site.cas.cz.

<sup>50</sup> Castells, M. (2000), op.cit., pp. 68-168.



## IMPLICATIONS

Polanyi's pragmatic approach suggests the possibility that flagrant failure of systemic policies will be met with some reaction over time. Hayek argued that capitalism would fail both from a success standpoint and a failure standpoint. That is, if capitalism were continually successful, populations would yield to the altruistic argument that capitalism was destroying values and ethics. Thus, it would fail. The pessimistic view, or leftist articulation, was that capitalistic *failure* would cause its demise and usher in either the welfare state of communitarianism or the corporate state (Russia's current algorithm). Both then argue that the demise lies in the seeds of the ideology. Wallerstein<sup>51</sup> and neo-Marxists count progress in terms of 1789, 1848, 1917, and 1968. They are lugubrious about the snail's pace of collectivism but clear on the ultimate outcome. Seen in that light, Stalin set back totalitarian Jacobinism, not Communism. His thuggery emasculated communitarianism. Hobsbawm would agree. The world seems a bit paralyzed by the tug of war between choosing from among stationary bandits, technological euphoria of consumerism, wealth accumulation and self-interest. It turns therefore to the welfare state, adjusting at the margins where necessary. For some, this means an inexorable march to the 'meritocracy.' To Havel, Adam Michnik, Milan Kundera and many artists, actors, sculptors and authors, a slow death would be a kinder solution.

Sosa<sup>52</sup> suggests that breakthroughs are occurring in acceptance of diversity as global networks increase information (knowledge) and IT enhances global communication. Castells<sup>53</sup> stresses that networks are more likely to act in self-interest using information to sharpen strategies. Secondly, he is not sanguine about transnational improvements in globalized socio-economic 'ghettoes' such as intensive labor 'sweatshops' located often within developed countries. The fruits of globalization do not normally raise all ships in the water equally but act differentially. Typically antagonism to low wages and difficult working conditions requires resistance. Yet poverty is slowly reducing in certain local markets as supply side economics reaches low value added jobs. Despite these disparate market intersections, governments such as India have necessarily increased redistribution payments to alleviate gaps between market solutions and market failures. Castells further

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<sup>51</sup> Wallerstein, I. (1974), "The Rise and Demise of the World Capitalist System: Concepts for Comparative Analysis," *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, 16, 4: 387-415.

<sup>52</sup> Sosa, O. (undated), op. cit.

<sup>53</sup> Castells, O. (2000), op. cit.

elaborates that communal groups are mounting resistance to inequities conceptualized by localized minorities as state and nationally bound, partially exacerbated by globalization. Invidious behavior by states and national governments seems to cross national borders as transnational invectives. *Resistance*<sup>54</sup>, then, responds similarly by seeking alliances with cross-border aggrieved via enhanced forms of information technology.<sup>55</sup>

Dror spoke of *raison d'etat* and *raison d'humanite*. Why must we consider only transcendence as an *input*? It can be an *output*. It would not harmonize with Dror's conception but harmonizes closer with praxis rather than metaphysics. Perhaps we are not ready for metaphysics. Marx despaired of praxis interfering with metaphysics. Wallerstein may not live to see his dream come true. Hobsbawm must have foregone non-Stalinist communism as occurring during his lifetime. Althusser, Gramsci, Habermas and all the Frankfurt School became very disenchanted with mankind (Habermas still has hopes). Even Plato remorsefully turned toward law as supplanting philosopher kings. By including *examples* of moving from *raison d'etat* to *raison d'humanite*, we may find a better fit. History would not disagree. We need not wait for another Gandhi, M.L. King or Havel. Their examples seem to have mystified populations. Their successors are not now evident. We might better abandon any attempt to change mankind or to find a better model of governmental decision making; though the latter seems researchable if distant. What is closer, is to concentrate on those examples of change that reflect concern for humanity. Tracing their occurrence may suggest either a black box causation or multiple inputs from numbers of people including populations. Rather than how or why, we turn first to what, and then to searching for the ingredients within the potential examples of *raison d'humanite* among Visegrad Four countries.

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<sup>54</sup> Castells, M. (1997, 2004a), op.cit. ; Castells asserts the point emphasizing *resistance* later in the paper, p. 25, fn 77.

<sup>55</sup> Thousands of Chongking residents and supporters from elsewhere in China responded to an urgent **blogging announcement** that a couple in the city was being extricated from their house precariously perched in solitude in the center of a housing reconstruction site. "You are our heroes," shouted the quickly gathering multitudes. Kwong, P. (2007), "When Rulers Are Not Virtuous, Sparks Fly," *International Herald Tribune*, April 5, p. 6.

## **POTENTIAL RAISON D' HUMANITE OUTCOMES AMONG THE VISEGRAD FOUR.**

By eschewing causation and seeking correlation we search for *raison d' humanite* outcomes among the *Visegrad Four*. *Should we find any, they may serve to illustrate occasions of new meaning attached to humanite.* We relax the search to avoid having to prove transcendence. Showing this would require abundant examples of transcendent leaders within the Visegrad Four. This seems unlikely there as everywhere else. We concentrate not on the actors but on the outcomes. We leave causation until such time as sufficient examples suggest sampling a larger universe. For the moment, we need first to demonstrate there are *any* examples. That would provide possible hypotheses for further research. Among such hypotheses would be one that asks whether or not the transcendent change was caused by an actor or the confluence of some other forces (not excluding a role for actors yet perhaps attributing the result to additional forces). We search the Visegrad Four for examples.

Our test is whether or not the outcomes demonstrated “thinking outside the box;” added new meaning; and, contributed to a priority of positively affecting individuals vs. prioritizing rewards to the state. We search to see whether each of the four meets the test(infra):

1. Each outcome postulated a new relationship at the expense of the *status quo*, the latter, seemingly a more convenient option for states embedded within the Soviet block;
2. Each outcome transformed the *identity, dignity and potential wellbeing* of citizens having been subjugated to a stifling drain on humanity;
3. Each outcome de-emphasized central actors while passing renewed responsibility and enthusiasm to *citizens*;
4. Each outcome tended to *unify* the population rather than *exclude* citizens from each other thus expiating a societal climate of mistrust, state interest, tyranny of values, cohesion and communication.

## **EXPLICATING THE VISEGRAD FOUR EXPERIENCE**

We are now in a position to extract the *ex ante* variables from England's 19<sup>th</sup> century and apply them to the Visegrad Four. We jump some 250 years, and examine the V-4 with respect to: **time period, groups involved and degree of violence** surrounding the Velvet Revolution that has now been termed by Ash a *refolution*. Thus, it was relatively a peaceful set of activities conducted by various groups transforming into

*movements* rather than armed insurrections. Though it is not impossible that the V-4 reforms, causing, but not demanding regime change, could retrogress and become authoritarian, the perspective of 2007 suggests this is unlikely. The reforms were broad based; and seemed to encapsulate the will of the people.

**Table 4:** Visegrad four reforms, circa 1989.<sup>56</sup>

Country	Time period	Groups involved	Violence/non-violence
Czecho-slovakia (Czech and Slovak Republics)	<b>14 days</b> <sup>57</sup>	<p>“A political scientist would be hard pressed to find a term to describe the Forum’s (Civic Forum)structure of decision making, let alone the hierarchy of authority within it...The majority of those present have been active in opposition before, the biggest single group being signatories of Charter77.<sup>58</sup> Twenty years ago they were journalists, academics, politicians, lawyers, but now they come here from their jobs as stokers, window cleaners, clerks or, at best, banned writers...”<sup>59</sup></p> <p>The occasion of this concert was special because of the orchestra itself. The entire orchestra (Czech Philharmonic)<sup>60</sup> had refused to appear on radio or TV because of the regime’s persecution of signatories to the “A Few Sentences Petition”... The orchestra was the first to make</p>	Some violence inflicted on the demonstrators by the Soviet Army during 1968; very little from internal police in 1989.

<sup>56</sup> The paper cannot recreate a complete history of the V-4 Velvet Revolution. Timothy Garton Ash was an eyewitness; this paper largely uses his description to illustrate the nature of the “movements.”

<sup>57</sup> By the tenth day, the die were cast.

<sup>58</sup> Charter 77; Initial Declaration of Charter 77 (1977), accessed on 11/23/08, at [http://libpro.cts.cuni.cz/charter/docs/declaration\\_of\\_charter\\_77.pdf](http://libpro.cts.cuni.cz/charter/docs/declaration_of_charter_77.pdf) .

<sup>59</sup> Ash, T.G. (1990, 1999), op.cit., p. 86.

<sup>60</sup> Under Vaclav Neuman’s direction.

		<p>a stand, and as such are now national heroes. A huge Czech flag and a banner: "Concert for Civic Forum," was visible to the audience. When the orchestra filed in, the audience rose to its feet, applauding and shouting "BRAVO, BRAVO," for at least ten minutes non-stop. There were tears in every eye. It was a long time before they could play a short piece by Smetana..."<sup>61</sup></p>	
<p>Hungary</p>	<p>1956 had seen demonstrations turn into serious violence inflicted by the Soviet Army. Imre Nagy had been one of the heroes of 1956. Nagy had been tried and executed following 1956. Thus, the Hungarian movement "refolution" began in 1988, 31 years following Nagy's burial. He had been buried in plot 301 in an outlying Budapest cemetery in a remote corner. In the spring of 1988, Janos Kadar was on his way out as Communist leader. A Committee for Historical Justice was established. By June 16, 1989, it had been decided: reburial. The ceremony was</p>	<p>Following the Nagy reburial, negotiations ensued among the Communist Party (within: the reformers and non-reformers) and opposition groups.<sup>65</sup> An agreement was signed on September 18, 1989. It envisaged a fully free parliamentary election.<sup>66</sup> Seven political groups were key: Free Democrats, Social Democrats, Small Holders, People's Party, Hungarian Democratic Forum, Alliance of Young Democrats and the Hungarian Communist Party (reformers and non-reformers)..</p>	<p>After Nagy's first burial, very little.</p>

<sup>61</sup> Deitch, G. (2002), *For the Love of Prague*, 4<sup>th</sup> ed. Prague: Baset Books, ISBN 13:978-8086223094

	<p>conducted at Heroes' Square...The crowd was subdued.<sup>62</sup> Finally Viktor Orban spoke urging..."we can put an end to the Communist dictatorship."<sup>63</sup> Adam Michnik was there representing the Polish/Hungarian Solidarity.<sup>64</sup> Nagy has been reported as saying, "I wonder if the people who now sentence me to death won't be the ones who will rehabilitate me later." The funeral marked the end of the post-1956 period.</p>		
<p>Poland</p>	<p>The Polish Round Table Agreement was signed on April 5, 1989. Its preamble declared the document to be 'the beginning of the road to parliamentary democracy.'<sup>67</sup></p>	<p>"First there was Solidarity's own extraordinary triumph in the June elections, which led to the appointment of the first non-communist prime minister in Eastern Europe for forty years. Then there was the reburial in Budapest of the hero of the Hungarian Revolution 1956, Imre Nagy, and the events that led from that to the first formal dissolution of a ruling East European communist party...the 'cutting of the Iron Curtain' between Hungary and Austria allowed a growing number of East Germans to escape across that non 'green' frontier.<sup>68</sup> Ultimately Garton Ash called the movements in all four countries, 'refolutions.'<sup>69</sup></p>	<p>The first election (June 4, 1989), Solidarity</p>

<sup>65</sup> Ibid., p. 57.

<sup>66</sup> Ibid., p. 57.

<sup>62</sup> Ash, T.G. (1990, 1999), op.cit. ( p. 51).

<sup>63</sup> Ibid.

<sup>64</sup> Ibid., p. 52.

<sup>67</sup> Ibid., p. 18.

<sup>68</sup> Ibid., p. 19.

<sup>69</sup> Ibid., p. 20.

		<p>should have won by a landslide; and it did. Solidarity's hastily improvised daily, <i>Gazeta Wyborca</i>, reported the news. A runoff was necessary with the final vote being 62%. Solidarity was the loose structure of national, regional, and local 'Citizens Committees, which actually organized the election campaigns...joined by many people: doctors, engineers, teachers, journalists, who had not been so active before.'<sup>70</sup> "The Balcerowicz team (finance) got together with exemplary speed, setting out a program to make up for not just 50 lost days but 50 lost years. Within a fortnight, Balcerowicz presented to the finance ministers of the Western World, at an IMF<sup>71</sup> meeting in Washington the outline of their plan to 'transform the Polish economy into a market economy...' By December 17 he presented to the Polish Parliament a balanced budget and a package of eleven laws designed to lay the foundations of the Polish economy for the next half-century."<sup>7273</sup></p>	
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We argue, by inspection, that the four movements meet the test. The examples exemplify transcendence in ways that would gain Dror's approval. Of course, the question is, was this *transcendence* or *political movements*? We know that examples exist of heroic behavior in battles, fires, natural disasters, and other types of emergencies. Mankind often exhibits good Samaritan behavior though seldom on a regular basis. Crises can trigger such behavior in persons otherwise having quite average, even unexciting lives. In the Table 4 cases, however, power was challenged in a *political* setting rather than the unfortunate occurrence of a natural disaster. Dror would be comfortable with such leadership, even if emerging from a sense of a *weakening* of Soviet power that might have been astutely recognized by the participants.

<sup>70</sup> Ibid., p.46.

<sup>71</sup> International Monetary Fund

<sup>72</sup> Ash, T.G . (1990, 1999), op.cit., p. 43.

<sup>73</sup> Quipped Garton Ash, "It took 10 years to bring democracy to Poland, 10 months to accomplish it in Hungary, 10 weeks in East Germany but only 10 days in Czechoslovakia." Ibid., p. 78.

Timothy Garton Ash's<sup>74</sup> accounts of these events suggest that these were not revolutions as much as public demonstrations. Those participating in the changes contemplated a *sharing* of power rather than a zero/sum game. That is not to say that participants were **certain** of a non-response from the Soviet side. Rather, that the participants at **most** stages assessed conditions to be propitious for change even if not total change. Ash seems to make rather clear that each of the key participants *believed they could make an improvement in the status quo* in such a way that benefits would accrue to the larger population. That those in power would "voluntarily" yield power did not seem to be a likely outcome. One can attribute bravado, courage, astuteness, luck and a number of characteristics that permeated the atmosphere. Thus, while individual leadership was frequently evident, the mood of those participating was more that of a *movement* than transcendence or coercion.

## **ANALYSIS**

While it is tempting to think that transcendence is an entity that can inhere to individuals, the above examples suggest the power of group effort embedded in compromise and negotiation. Coercive change simply postpones peaceful change. The French Revolution occurred in tandem with Napoleon's march to Russia, Egypt and most of Europe.<sup>75</sup> Ultimately the French returned to a monarchy, modified by constitutional provisions. World Wars I and II rearranged national borders, deposed most existing monarchs and deposited both Europe and North America into the Cold War. Ethnic and racial groups are still seeking a place in the sun at the commencement of the 21<sup>st</sup> century. Assuming Doomsday does not occur, resolution of boundaries, identities, peace and cooperation will continue in political settings often juxtaposed against economic realities. Despite evidence of political, economic and social advances, the world continues to ponder and negotiate power relationships not conforming to a global leviathan but rather to continuing reassessments of non-zero sum games. While occasionally states act in concert to alleviate cross-border problems such as global warming, pollution, nuclear dangers, starvation, poverty, and disease, such solutions are often bilateral rather than regional or global. The concept that one human being is as good as another seems distant. What is relatively clear, however, is that forms of governance, both from a structural and process perspective, seem incapable of causing improvement for large numbers of populations around the world. It

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<sup>74</sup> Ash, T.G. (1990, 1999), op. cit.

<sup>75</sup> Goodwin, A. (1966), *The French Revolution*, New York: Harper and Row; Asprey, R. (2000), *The Rise of Napoleon*, New York: Basic Books, ISBN 0-465-04881-1.



seems unlikely, however, that a few transcendent leaders in the world, even if they existed, would or could surpass the combined intelligence of the world. Societies are moving toward knowledge as a crucial ingredient in resolving public problems. This metamorphosis may well transform both the structure and process of governing in view of continuing pathologies of health, climate, productivity, culture and general well being. Each of the transcendent examples mentioned above: Gandhi, M.L. King and Havel, were forced to step aside (Havel peacefully; Gandhi and King by assassination) without demonstrating that following change, they might transform political entities toward *ex post* transcendence. Mandela might well be added to these examples.

### **TOP DOWN CONUNDRUM**

There is very little evidence that public decision frameworks are transitioning to flatter hierarchies. Dror can take solace in society's penchant for unipolar hierarchies. In that sense, he is right. History supports continuing vulnerability to patriarchal/matriarchal decision models. Michels concludes:

“Organization implies the tendency to oligarchy. In every organization, whether it be a political party, a professional union, or any other association of the kind, the aristocratic tendency manifests itself very clearly...completely inverting the respective position of the leaders and the led. As a result of organization, every party or professional union becomes divided into a minority of directors and a majority of directed.”<sup>76</sup>

The Westminster model and state boundaries are regularly penetrated by political, economic, militaristic, social and criminal networks bound either by metaphysical arguments (insurgencies) or self interest (economic interest).<sup>77</sup> Castells asserts,

“...what this movement affirms by its existence, regardless of its content and future evolution, is the oldest rule in the dynamics of human societies: *where there is domination, there is resistance to domination...*”<sup>78</sup>

Such networks may well utilize instant communicative technologies or they may delegate decision making to subsidiary levels. Such devolution of authority may, however, give a false illusion. Communications can

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<sup>76</sup> Michels, R. op. cit.

<sup>77</sup> Castells, M. (2000), op. cit.

<sup>78</sup> Italics are my emphasis. Quote is from Castells, M. (1997, 2004), p. 147.

range from secret to quite public. It is more likely that *public* communications will win out in the end. It is true that fear of reprisal may hinder communications. Protection of patents may provide incentives and deliver financial reward for certain periods of time. World peace is more likely to be the result of open than closed communications. This lies at the center of a knowledge society. Globalization is not simply the taking of low hanging fruit to the exclusion of longer term commitments. Globalized knowledge, as opposed to information, promises to supplant manufacturing as a driving force of peace and prosperity. The current juxtaposition of China and India exemplifies the decision framework. China manages its market economy through a state prism. The rest of East and South Asia does so as well but prefers a pragmatic approach to an ideological approach. India and the west prefers group decision making, tolerating state and market failures. But the parallel tracks will compete in the search for knowledge however they conclude that can be obtained. Once the knowledge power of individuals becomes unleashed, transcendence will find its appropriate level. It is conceivable that at that point, *raison d'humanite* may emerge.

## **THE VISEGRAD FOUR**

In order to test Dror's hypothesis that the world would greatly gain from transformation to transcendence we have examined the Visegrad Four. We did so since these four countries experienced an almost simultaneous transformation from Soviet Block members to candidates for independence. Their common past was embedded in a closed political system not known for thinking outside the box or experimenting with overt actions of political dissent. Having tried this in 1956 and 1968<sup>79</sup> they were rebuffed. In 1989, it was not clear until Gorbachev's visit to Poland that the Soviet military would not intervene should a governmental or regime change occur. Even then, activists were dubious that the military would stay in the barracks. Reform was the objective. If that meant power sharing, the movement would take it. In a sense, the domino effect rapidly took place. Once Solidarnost' in Poland froze Zaruski in his tracks, the three remaining countries moved toward reform, achieving regime change that had not been entirely certain. While *ex post* we now know that political power had been hollowed out, this was certainly a tentative outcome, *ex ante*. Accordingly these four countries were able to approach transcendence or an out-of-the-box strategy for reforming regimes with virtually no loss of life. Considering 1953, 1956, 1968 and then 1989, the outcome might have been predicted but certainly no one in the west had such an

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<sup>79</sup> And 1953 in E. Germany.

illusion. Timothy Garton Ash's<sup>80</sup> reporting suggests that communication among the four countries was substantial as well as on site consulting and strategizing among leaders and supporters.

Ash's accounts provide a great deal of support for a wide circle of activists punctuated by differing opinions yet hardly a stampeding toward physically rushing the barricades. Has such behavior been repeated by leaders in the four countries since 1989? We are hard pressed to argue that such has happened. The Velvet or 'soft' revolutions were not absolute replicas of John Kennedy's anti group-think decision making that resulted in rebuffing Krushchev's missile carrying transports despite the possibility of war, possibly even nuclear war.<sup>81</sup> While the Cuban Missile Crisis had become an emergency for the U.S., it might have been a Soviet bluff, albeit a very-high-share-poker bluff that very few in the world might have put onto the table. Neither Kennedy nor anyone else, however, could be certain what the result of a naval blockade would be. Some of the alternatives proposed by Kennedy's think group were far more aggressive. Kennedy's blockade probably approached transcendence. The paper argues then, that the Visegrad Four, at least *partially*, in Table 4, demonstrated thinking outside the box and such thinking benefited from group participation in ways that exceeded the views of any one person. Unlike the portents of Kennedy's decision, it was a *political* decision without the horrendous stakes of nuclear war. Yet even Kennedy said of the blockade, he (Krushchev) is a politician; I have to give him a way out of this.

Despite Michels' skepticism about the ability of organization and democracy to overcome oligarchy, he admits its slight theoretical potential for contributing toward a breeding ground for free souls pursuing critique and reformist objectives. Says Michels,

"...the defects of democracy will be found to inhere in its inability to get rid of its aristocratic scoriae. On the other hand, nothing but a serene and frank examination of the oligarchical dangers of democracy will enable us to minimize these dangers even though they can never be entirely avoided."<sup>82</sup> Further,

"When democracies have gained a certain stage of development, they undergo a gradual transformation, adopting the aristocratic spirit,

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<sup>80</sup> Ash, T.G. (1990, 1999), op. cit.

<sup>81</sup> Allison, G. (1970), "Conceptual Models and The Cuban Missile Crisis," *American Political Science Review*, LXIII, September.

<sup>82</sup> Michels, R. in Grusky, O. and Miller, G.A. (1970), op. cit.

and in many cases also the aristocratic forms, against which at the outset they struggled so fiercely.”<sup>83</sup>

## CONCLUSION

We have examined Dror’s hypothesis that the world would be better off if it accepted and or put into place transcendent leaders very reminiscent of Plato’s philosopher kings. We are unable to support his hypothesis but his discussion led us to locate *examples* of thinking that illustrated something akin to **partial** transcendence: thinking outside the box and adding meaning to typical prescriptions. *Political* decisions are inured in power situations. People who rush into a burning building or airplane to rescue victims are not acting in political terms. They are certainly heroic. They are thinking of other humans in a way that does not often confront Samaritans, good or bad. Political situations require high levels of perspicacity, intelligence and concern for individual human beings both in a collective and individual sense. Perhaps too often, politicians interpret the ‘general will’ as what is in their own best interest (*raison d’etat*). The paper argues that electing leaders who will, in some fashion, lead the rest of the citizens to higher levels of wellbeing is not now envisioned given the results of history and the distractions and impediments of power that publics have yielded to their leaders. A knowledge society can well afford to widen the circle of individuals participating in public policy decision making. Those societies that do so are likely to surpass those that seek to create philosopher kings. Dror has made us think. Vive l’ humanite.

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<sup>83</sup> Ibid.

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