TWO NEW SOLUTIONS FOR SEN’S IMPOSSIBILITY OF A PARETIAN LIBERTARIAN |
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Mihai Daniel Ungureanu Abstract:
This article is about Sen’s impossibility of a paretian libertarian theorem. First, I make some preliminary considerations and I give the standard social choice definitions. Second, I briefly present Sen’s result. Third I review nine of the solutions given for Sen’s problem: three restrictions of the weak Pareto condition, three restrictions of the libertarian condition and three restrictions of the universal domain. Fourth I introduce the ideological fidelity as an acceptability criterion for any solution of Sen’s inconsistency result. I use this criterion for rejecting all restrictions of the libertarian and universal domain conditions. Fifth, I present two new solutions which satisfy ideological fidelity. These two solutions consist in restraining the paretian condition’s domain only to those individual preferences which are a) minimal-rational libertarian or b) single-peaked on x-aspects (a concept introduced in this paper).
Key words: social decision function, libertarian paradox, ideological fidelity, efficacity for real societies, minimal-rational libertarian preferences, single peaked preferences.
For comments I would like to thank Professor Adrian Miroiu. Mihai Daniel Ungureanu is PhD. Candidate at the Faculty of Political Science, National School of Political and Administrative Studies, Bucharest, Romania.
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